United Nations S/2005/505

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 August 2005

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 1 August 2005 by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, stating that John R. Bolton has been appointed representative of the United States of America on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1592 (2005) of 30 March 2005, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and resolution 1565 (2004) of 1 October 2004, by which the Council requested me to keep it informed regularly of developments in the Mission area. The present report provides an update on electoral planning since my special report on elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2005/320 of 26 May 2005), and covers major developments since my last regular report, of 15 March 2005 (S/2005/167).

II. Political developments

2. While the end of the first 24 months of the transition on 30 June was threatened by calls for violent disturbances, the situation remained relatively calm throughout the period. The Transitional Government maintained public order during periods of heightened tension at the end of June and early in July and the first weeks of the six-month extension of the transition have been generally peaceful.

3. In addresses to the Parliament on 16 May and 28 June, President Kabila called for an "assessment of the Government's performance" and a cabinet reshuffle. On 8 July, changes were announced in senior diplomatic and military appointments and some nominations were made for the *petite territoriale* (local administration). However, contacts between the Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (PPRD) and the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS), regarding the inclusion of some UDPS or Parti Lumumbiste unifié (PALU) officials in the transitional institutions produced no tangible results. On 16 July, the Presidents of Angola, the Republic of the Congo and Gabon visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo to demonstrate their support for the transition and promote inclusiveness in the process.

4. The debate over the future of the transition has divided the Congolese polity into two major camps. The parties participating in the transitional institutions — PPRD, the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement

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congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-G) and the Forces du futur — favoured an extension of the transition. At the same time, political parties that are largely not represented in the transitional institutions — led by UDPS and including PALU, the Groupe des Quatorze of political parties, the Mouvement du 17 mai, and the Forces novatrices pour l'union et la solidarité — accused the Transitional Government of failing to organize the elections on time, opposed an automatic extension of the transition, and called for public demonstrations to stop the transitional process.

5. Concerns that such rhetoric and large-scale actions called for by UDPS would lead to violent demonstrations and an escalation of violence between demonstrators and security forces did not materialize. By 30 June, almost 250,000 voters had received their electoral cards in Kinshasa, thus providing tangible proof of progress in the transition and that the electoral process was finally under way. Moreover, late in June, the Transitional Government, as a show of force, held military parades in Kinshasa and the major provincial cities. The military returned to barracks and on 30 June the Police nationale congolaise, in particular the Police d'intervention rapide unit trained by Angola and France, were deployed for crowd control.

6. Significantly, neither church leaders nor a large number of students joined UDPS in its calls for demonstrations. The Conférence episcopale nationale du Congo called for the urgent establishment of a follow-up committee on elections to mediate difficulties stemming from the electoral process. High-level diplomatic visits prior to 30 June helped to reduce tensions, including visits by the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso.

7. There were, however, some clashes between demonstrators and security forces from 29 June to 1 July, resulting in one death in Kinshasa, five in Tshikapa and seven in Mbuji-Mayi. More than 400 protesters and representatives of political parties — including many high-level UDPS officials — were temporarily detained in Kinshasa and in the Kasais. However, most were released within 24 hours.

8. Since 30 June, UDPS has displayed greater willingness to organize its public activities within legal parameters. Its political rally on 9 July in Kinshasa was attended by some 20,000 UDPS supporters and was organized with the consent of the Transitional Government.

Legislative agenda

9. Significant progress was made during the ordinary session of Parliament, which closed on 4 July. On 13 May, the National Assembly adopted the draft Constitution, which will be submitted to a referendum currently scheduled for 27 November. On 17 June, the Senate and the National Assembly, in a joint decision, approved the extension of the transition for a period of six months, under article 196 of the Transitional Constitution and, on 23 June, President Kabila promulgated the referendum law.

10. National and international experts are now reviewing the preliminary draft of the electoral law, prepared by the Independent Electoral Commission and the Ministry of the Interior. Following approval by the Council of Ministers, the draft

law is to be reviewed concurrently by the National Assembly and the Senate in order to accelerate the adoption process.

Electoral process

11. On 18 June, 186 of the 221 registered political parties signed a code of conduct prepared by the Independent Electoral Commission, outlining the principles for conducting the electoral process in a transparent, equitable, credible and non-violent manner. UDPS and PPRD have yet to sign the code of conduct.

12. On 20 June, voter registration began in Kinshasa, and, on 25 July, commenced in Bas-Congo and Province Orientale. By 26 July, more than 2.7 million voters had registered. Registration will be implemented for security reasons in five phases: starting in Kinshasa, followed by Province Orientale and Bas-Congo; Katanga, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental; Maniema, North and South Kivu; and ending with Bandundu and Equateur by 30 September. The Independent Electoral Commission, with the assistance of MONUC, has identified 9,000 voter registration centres across the country and the recruitment and training of the 40,000 registration officers has begun.

13. The gap between available funds and upcoming needs related to the elections is of serious concern. The estimated total budget for elections is $422 million dollars, including $270 million to support the electoral process through the Independent Electoral Commission. To date, some $272.8 million has been pledged against the Commission's budget, including some $100 million at a donors meeting convened by the European Union in Brussels on 11 July. However, the additional $103 million estimated for MONUC to move electoral materials to the 145 territories and 21 major cities is still pending a decision of the Security Council. If the funds are not approved, the electoral timetable could experience considerable delays.

14. Furthermore, the Transitional Government estimates that some $48 million will be required for electoral security, including for training and equipping the police. A communications system for election security would require a further $14.25 million. Pledges have been received from the European Union, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Transitional Government that would nearly cover the full amount. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has established a basket fund to manage donor contributions for security.

15. While registration is to be completed by October and the referendum is to be held on or about 27 November, the Government has yet to publicly announce the full electoral timetable, including provisional dates for the provincial and presidential polls which can be confirmed once the electoral law has been finalized. There is concern that, if these dates are not made public, efforts to create the secure conditions needed for holding free and fair elections could be undermined.

16. The Independent Electoral Commission launched a civic education campaign on 18 June, and is disseminating throughout the country most of the major legal texts relating to the elections, including the nationality and registration laws and the draft Constitution, in the four national languages (Swahili, Lingala, Tshiluba and Kikongo). MONUC, in partnership with the UNDP and Appui au processus électoral

au Congo, has produced four videos on the electoral process in the different languages. Women's groups are advocating for an increased role for women in the electoral process, and the Association of Women Lawyers is implementing a strategy for monitoring the voter registration process.

Regional relations

17. Following the adoption of the Dar es Salaam Declaration in November 2004, the 11 core countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region are preparing project documents and protocols to be adopted by the second summit on the Great Lakes, which is to be held in November 2005 in Nairobi. Under the framework of the Conference, which is organized under the auspices of the United Nations and the African Union, the core countries are engaged in discussions on key issues facing the region with regard to peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and humanitarian and social questions.

18. During the reporting period, some progress was made towards de-escalating regional tensions as a result of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda at Lubumbashi on 21 April, under the United States-facilitated Tripartite Agreement. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to ending the presence and activities of foreign armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. They also agreed to support the efforts of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to disarm, demobilize and repatriate to Rwanda the combatants of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), with the support of MONUC. Participants also agreed to establish a "fusion cell" for the exchange and analysis of information relating to border security.

19. The Foreign Minister of Rwanda, Charles Murigande, visited Kinshasa on 21 and 22 June, to follow up with the Transitional Government on the long-awaited appointment of a Rwandan ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following a request by Rwanda, the Transitional Government authorized an investigation, which is currently being conducted by the Joint Verification Team at Goma, into the alleged presence of Rwandan combatants at the Mushaki *brassage* centre in North Kivu. Meanwhile, the Goma Joint Verification Team is awaiting authorization from the Transitional Government to investigate allegations that Rwandan military prisoners of war are being detained in Kisangani and Kinshasa.

20. Developments in Burundi affected security in the east, as the Burundian National Defence Forces launched attacks on the Forces nationales de libération (FNL), despite efforts to reach a comprehensive ceasefire following the signing of a declaration at Dar es Salaam on 15 May. Reports of increasing numbers of FNL rebels in the east adversely affected relations between the two countries, and reports continue of Burundian Army elements shelling Congolese territory. In order to address the situation, the FARDC Tenth Military Region Commander requested MONUC support for the establishment of a coordinated bilateral verification mechanism. MONUC and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) are looking into this matter and monitoring the situation closely.

III. Implementation of the mandate of the Mission

Security situation

Ituri

21. The security situation in Ituri remains volatile, despite robust measures taken by FARDC with MONUC support to disarm combatants. Moreover, the Transitional Government has yet to take the necessary measures to extend its authority, particularly security and administrative services, throughout the district.

22. During the reporting period, MONUC and the integrated FARDC brigade conducted cordon and search and area domination activities in the region. The temporary forceful expulsion of the Union des patriotes congolais-Lubanga wing (UPC-L) from its stronghold in Katoto on 24 May in a joint FARDC-MONUC operation reduced the group's area of control and improved security in the district.

23. Under the disarmament and community reintegration programme, which ended on 25 June, 15,607 combatants of various militia groups, including 4,395 children (840 of whom were girls) were disarmed and some 6,200 weapons collected, of which, however, 70 per cent were unserviceable. The successful completion of the disarmament phase of the programme is attributable to MONUC activities and joint action with the Congolese authorities, using a robust political, judicial and military approach.

24. The sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, or the military integration of ex-militia elements into FARDC, remains a major challenge to be addressed. Two thirds of the ex-combatants remain unemployed and former combatants are likely to be tempted to take up arms again without prospects for long-term socio-economic opportunities. The implementation of reinsertion projects, costing some $3 million, is progressing slowly. The main responsibility for community reinsertion rests with the national authority for disarmament and reintegration, CONADER, which is financed by the World Bank-sponsored Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. Over the past month, CONADER, together with UNDP, has intensified its efforts and has approved a number of additional reintegration projects.

25. As a result of the disarmament exercise, the Forces armees du peuple congolais (FAPC) and the Union des patriotes congolais-Kisembo wing (UPC-K) have ceased to exist. Reports indicate that, although severely weakened following the disarmament of their forces and the arrest of most of their leaders, UPC-L, the Front nationaliste intégrationniste (FNI), the Forces de resistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI) and the Parti pour l'unité et la sauvegarde de l'integrité du Congo (PUSIC) are attempting to consolidate their remaining forces under a new alliance called the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais. These groups, motivated by cross-border illegal business interests, continue to disrupt the extension of State authority by targeting FARDC positions and MONUC patrols and menacing local populations. Some 50 recalcitrant militia leaders together with some 1,200 armed elements remain at large in Ituri, concentrated in the Irumu, Djugu and Mahagi territories.

26. During MONUC-led robust military operations at Lugo on 2 June and at Medu on 27 June a change in tactics by armed elements was noted, including attacks on MONUC helicopters, use of human shields and abandoning militia camps to hide

among the population. I am most concerned that these groups are apparently being rearmed and trained with external support in contravention of Security Council resolutions.

27. It is difficult to assess whether direct support to the militia groups in Ituri is being provided from neighbouring countries. Reports indicate, however, that representatives of the groups move freely between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Rwanda, including for meetings and to conduct financial transactions. In a striking development, many representatives of armed groups met openly in Kampala in mid-June to form the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais, whose aim is to oppose the extension of State authority throughout Ituri. There are unconfirmed reports that militia in Ituri are regularly receiving weapons, including across Lake Albert. I strongly urge neighbouring States to ensure that remaining militia groups are not allowed to use their territories as rear bases, safe havens or as a supply route for illegal arms trafficking.

28. The presence of FARDC troops in Ituri and their continuing joint activities with MONUC represent the most visible manifestation of State authority. However, the Congolese troops are not paid regularly, lack long-term sustainment and are poorly equipped, particularly in logistical support including communications, vehicles and uniforms.

29. At the same time, while revenues from taxes and customs duties have started trickling into Government channels, the State is far from having full control over Ituri's resources. Revenues generated in areas occupied by remaining militia groups, especially in mining areas, continue to be misappropriated, and customs and tax offices are poorly equipped and financed. The Transitional Government needs to urgently implement, with the support of its international partners, a comprehensive plan to extend State authority and stop the illegal exploitation of resources. The plan should include a budget for the administration of Ituri and a mechanism to ensure regular payments and logistical support for civil servants.

30. While most Ituri militia leaders are now imprisoned, the Transitional Government has yet to begin any formal legal action against them. Furthermore, some of those handed over to the Government by MONUC were recently released from a prison in Kinshasa. Several militia leaders remain at large and are continuing illegal business activities. Following reports that some militia leaders may have taken refuge in a neighbouring country, MONUC has urged the Transitional Government to issue international arrest warrants for them.

The Kivus

31. With regard to the Kivus, during the reporting period the local authorities and MONUC devoted much attention to developments related to the declaration made by FDLR on 31 March in Rome. Working together with MONUC, local authorities have taken steps to sensitize the local population and several senior Transitional Government representatives travelled to North and South Kivu to follow up on this process.

32. The MONUC North Kivu brigade has carried out operations in close coordination with FARDC against armed elements in the province to facilitate free and safe access for civilians, particularly on the Walikale-Goma and Goma-Beni routes, and to enhance security in the major population centres. Joint MONUC-

FARDC operations have also been conducted in FDLR-held areas to limit the group's freedom of movement.

33. In South Kivu, MONUC has recently deployed to the previously very volatile Walungu and Kabare areas and conducts joint operations with FARDC. In response to attacks by FDLR and other armed elements on the local population early in March, joint MONUC-FARDC operations in Walungu territory included foot patrols, supported by activities of rapid reaction helicopter units, in an attempt to stabilize the deteriorating security situation. MONUC also helped to organize community-based Village Vigilance Committees, which is an early warning system aimed at preventing attacks against the local population. On 23 May, during an attack against the village of Ihembe in Kabare territory by a group of armed FDLR-related elements, 25 persons were killed and several abducted.

34. On 1 July, MONUC and FARDC began a series of joint military operations in South Kivu to limit the movement of FDLR, while also protecting civilian populations. The two most recent operations, Operation Falcon Sweep and Operation Iron Fist, involved a larger number of troops and increased collaboration with FARDC. During those operations, MONUC and FARDC troops destroyed six empty FDLR camps on 14 July, after having first given warnings to the combatants to leave the area. MONUC aims to encourage those military elements to repatriate or move to more remote areas where they do not pose a threat to the local population.

35. Despite the increased intensity of MONUC military operations, during the night of 9 July unidentified elements attacked the village of Ntulamamba, 75 km west of Bukavu in South Kivu. A verification mission by MONUC conducted on 13 July found that some 47 persons, mostly women and children, had been killed. MONUC and FARDC are still trying to identify the assailants, while FDLR has denied involvement.

36. Security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is of particular concern in Ituri and the Kivus, is ultimately the responsibility of the Government. The MONUC exit strategy in those areas depends on the capacity of FARDC and the Congolese national police to provide a minimally acceptable level of security. Unfortunately, FARDC operations continue to suffer from a severe lack of basic logistic resources. More importantly, command and control within FARDC ranks depends on the provision of food and salaries for its soldiers. These issues must be addressed on an urgent basis, keeping in mind the long-term development of the Congolese security forces.

Katanga and the Kasais

37. As indicated in my last report, the security situation in Katanga and the Kasais depends largely on the state of law and order. During the reporting period, tensions heightened between the political parties, particularly UDPS and the provincial authorities.

38. Tensions increased in Mbuji-Mayi in May after the UDPS called for a *ville morte* to protest the extension of the transition beyond 30 June. The situation deteriorated on 17 and 18 May as first the headquarters of UDPS, then those of PPRD, MLC and RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération, were set on fire, resulting in two fatalities. Rumours regarding the perpetrators of the arson attacks

further increased tensions. In response, MONUC temporarily deployed a platoon of troops to the town primarily for the protection of its staff and premises, and facilitated meetings between UDPS and President Kabila's National Security Adviser in Mbuji-Mayi to reduce tensions.

39. The threat to the electoral process posed by particularly high political tensions and uncontrolled armed groups in the Kasais and Katanga remains an issue of serious concern. It is particularly important in those areas that the Government's security forces act in an impartial and professional manner. In my report of 26 May, I recommended that the Security Council consider the deployment of formed police units to key cities in these and other provinces, as well as an additional brigade of United Nations troops to address the threats posed by uncontrolled armed groups. I remain convinced that these proposals are key to allowing the electoral process to unfold in those areas.

Security sector reform and national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

40. The Joint Commission on Security Sector Reform has met five times since it was set up in January. Two subcommissions — on the military and the police — meet weekly to coordinate the implementation of the Commission's decisions. An important development during the reporting period has been the strengthening of donor coordination regarding the complex process of *brassage*, by which the various Congolese armed groups and forces are reconstituted into brigades in the national armed forces. The European Union and the Governments of Angola, Belgium, the Netherlands and South Africa, have either expressed interest in or are actively contributing to various aspects of this process. Donors have now committed themselves to supporting the six operational *brassage* sites: Mushaki and Nyaleke (North Kivu) by South Africa, using funding provided by the Government of the Netherlands; Kitona (Bas-Congo) by Angola; the *brassage* centres in South Kivu (Luberizi) and Province Orientale (Lukusu) may be supported by the European Union; and the Kamina centre (Katanga) by Belgium and South Africa. Nevertheless, conditions at the sites remain poor, as funding for their refurbishment has not yet been received.

41. South Africa has led efforts to conduct a census of FARDC and it appears that the numbers provided by the Transitional Government for troop strength were too high. The European Union has taken the lead, with the Congolese authorities and in consultation with the World Bank, MONUC and other donors, in developing plans for army integration and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which are expected to be submitted to the Joint Commission on Security Sector Reform for review.

42. The demobilization and reintegration into society of former adult combatants is proceeding slowly, mainly because of difficulties faced by CONADER and the pace of implementing reintegration projects. MONUC continues to work actively with its donor partners, particularly the MDRP, CONADER and the political and military authorities, to move the process forward.

Disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups

43. On 31 March, in Rome, the President of FDLR, Ignace Murwanashyaka, announced that FDLR had decided to renounce violence and denounce the Rwandan

genocide and was prepared to join the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation process. He visited Kinshasa early in May and subsequently travelled to North and South Kivu, apparently to sensitize FDLR combatants and prepare them to implement the Rome declaration.

44. In response, MONUC prepared six temporary assembly areas — at Lubero, Kanyabayonga, Sake, Hombo, Sange and Walungu — to receive the estimated 30,000 combatants and their dependants believed to be in North and South Kivu. However, Mr. Murwanashyaka left the country in mid-May without issuing orders to the combatants to enter the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation programme. While there has been a slight rise in voluntary participation in the programme by FDLR elements, there has been no large-scale repatriation. As at 27 June, 11,729 foreign combatants and their dependants had registered as having returned to their countries of origin since January 2003.

45. The Government of Uganda has strongly advocated that MONUC take military action against the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU). MONUC has requested the Ugandan authorities to provide it with information regarding possible ADF/NALU attacks. There are some indications that the upsurge in ADF/NALU activity is being instigated by other armed groups in the area.

46. The rank and file of ADF/NALU personnel have expressed to MONUC their willingness to be voluntarily repatriated to Uganda if they are given amnesty, and with the sanction of their commanders. The Transitional Government has verbally agreed to a request from the Government of Uganda, with MONUC support, to open a Ugandan Amnesty Commission office in Beni. A joint MONUC-Government of Uganda meeting with the ADF/NALU leaders is being planned to discuss the issue of amnesty and to obtain their support for the participation of their combatants in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation programme.

Police activities and deployment

47. On 1 April, the Transitional Government agreed on the co-location of MONUC police advisers with senior national police officers, including at the inspector general and provincial inspector level. MONUC has also enhanced its co-location arrangements with the commanding officers of the national police's mobile intervention units and the Congolese integrated police unit in Ituri to provide strategic guidance.

48. In the meantime, MONUC has trained some 600 Congolese police instructors, from a variety of police units. The instructors have been deployed to 12 police sectors throughout the country and will train some 18,500 police personnel. On 11 July, three-month training programmes for 1,240 personnel of the territorial police commenced in Bukavu, Bunia, Kindu, Mahagi and Goma. In June, MONUC conducted refresher courses in crowd control techniques for 158 national police officers in Mbuji-Mayi. Similar training is planned for several other police sectors. It was most encouraging that the mobile police unit trained by MONUC in Mbuji-Mayi demonstrated a satisfactory level of professionalism in dealing with crowds during public demonstrations held on 30 June in connection with the extension of the transition.

49. As noted in paragraph 14 above, donors have been encouraged by progress demonstrated in police reform and have provided some funding and equipment for Congolese police personnel and units being trained by MONUC. To date, some $7.5 million has been released through the UNDP basket fund and tenders have been issued for the purchase of non-lethal policing equipment. MONUC continues to provide operational support to the national police in securing voter registration operations in Kinshasa and has established liaison mechanisms between the Independent Electoral Commission and police units deployed to registration sites. MONUC is also closely assisting provincial police inspectors in finalizing operational plans in preparation for the extension of voter registration to the provinces.

50. On 3 May, President Kabila promulgated a decree establishing a mechanism for the preparation, with MONUC support, of an operational security plan for the electoral process. It is envisaged that the national police would have primary responsibility for security during elections, supported by FARDC. On 4 June, MONUC held a seminar, funded by the Governments of Sweden and South Africa, to develop an integrated strategy for electoral security. It was agreed that a national operation centre would be established to coordinate police and military activities and that the Ministries of the Interior and Defence would prepare a national security plan for the elections. MONUC will support the planning process.

Humanitarian situation

51. The protection of vulnerable populations remained a key priority during the reporting period. Killings, rapes and kidnappings by armed groups in South Kivu resulted in 59,000 internally displaced persons. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance were stretched to capacity. Following the arrival of MONUC troops in the area, 1,100 internally displaced persons returned to their homes. The World Food Programme continues to provide food to some 50,000 internally displaced persons and returnees in the Walungu territory and MONUC quick-impact projects are being used to rehabilitate roads and bridges to improve humanitarian access. Military escorts continue to facilitate humanitarian assessments and food deliveries to vulnerable populations in North Kivu.

52. In June, MONUC and UNDP facilitated the return by boat of some 2,000 internally displaced persons from Kinshasa to Kisangani. This pilot project was implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs, with inter-agency support. In view of deteriorating conditions at Lisala, MONUC organized the delivery of emergency supplies of blankets, plastic sheeting and medicines provided by UNDP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

53. The settlement for internally displaced persons at Kafe/Kakwa, which had housed up to 14,500 people, has been closed. A humanitarian mission on 15 June found that most of the 8,582 people remaining at the site are long-time residents. Assistance will now be provided to facilitate the return and reinsertion of the local population in the area.

54. The 2004/05 budget of $1 million for quick-impact projects has now been fully committed. Forty-six new proposals totalling $479,000 were approved during March, 29 of which are for the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Almost

halt are for rehabilitation projects that will significantly improve access and social services.

Human rights

55. During the reporting period, MONUC has documented an increase in the number of violations of human rights associated with the forthcoming elections, including the arbitrary arrest and detention of members of political opposition parties in several provinces, in particular Katanga, the Kasais, Orientale and Bas-Congo, and in Kinshasa.

56. Instances of the possible use of excessive force, including the shooting of unarmed civilians, by the security forces policing demonstrations are under investigation following the May and June demonstrations in Mbuji-Mayi, Kinshasa and Tshikapa. MONUC continues to impress upon provincial and central authorities an individual's right to the peaceful expression of political views. My Special Representative addressed a letter to President Kabila on 21 June concerning the difficulties faced by MONUC in accessing political detainees held in several detention facilities. While the Presidency has since indicated that the Government will facilitate such access, the Mission is still frequently prevented from monitoring political detainees.

57. In anticipation of election-related human rights violations, MONUC has established a special human rights investigative unit to report swiftly and publicly on such abuses. In June, the unit conducted a mission to Province Orientale to assess the risk of human rights violations against voters and members of political parties and found that closer monitoring was required. An investigation from 13 to 20 June into several allegations of arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances and deaths following the violence in Mbuji-Mayi in June found that 15 civilians had been killed and 26 wounded, all by gunfire from local security forces. Of the 39 people who were arbitrarily arrested, most were beaten while in custody; 35 persons were later released and 4 remain unaccounted for.

58. In the Kivus, special teams conducted investigations in May and June into abuses against civilians, particularly by armed Hutu groups in South Kivu. MONUC military have maintained a presence during and after such investigations to deter possible reprisals against the population by armed groups. On 18 May, the findings on the protection of civilians in those provinces were publicly announced. Meanwhile, further attacks against civilians reported in Ntulamamba during the night of 9 July are under investigation.

59. On 2 June, a human rights team in Ituri came under fire as it investigated alleged human rights abuses perpetrated by FNI militia under the command of Peter Karim in the village of Rakpa, approximately 60 km west of Mahagi. Further to reports that militia members had raped local women and forcibly recruited young people into the militia, human rights officers — with military escort — undertook a one-day visit to the village. The officers were unable to conduct interviews, owing to the presence of the militia, which put the local population at risk of reprisals. As the MONUC team was leaving, militia elements opened fire on a MONUC helicopter, hitting it and wounding four peacekeepers who were providing security for the civilian team. One of the peacekeepers (from Bangladesh) subsequently died.

Child protection

60. In order to protect children, particularly street children, from being used to foment public unrest and as potential targets of violence or repression, MONUC and child protection partners continue to sensitize local authorities in key cities. In Mbuji-Mayi, during unrest in May, most of the demonstrators were children and young people. As a result of sustained advocacy by MONUC and child protection partners, the draft Constitution includes several provisions on children, including defining the age of maturity as 18, and a State obligation to protect children from abandonment and all forms of violence, and from being accused of witchcraft. MONUC also intervened in seven cases of individuals under sentence of death who are currently under 18 or were at the time their sentences were passed.

HIV/AIDS

61. Information, sensitization and training on HIV/AIDS and related issues continue for MONUC staff. The Mission has also established a voluntary, confidential counselling and testing service in its level one, two and three hospital facilities, as well as in other areas where Mission personnel are deployed.

Rule of law

62. While the civilian and military justice systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain weak, judicial activity has increased in recent months, as civilian and military justice personnel have been deployed to provincial centres including Goma, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Lodja and Gbadolite. In order to help strengthen State authority, MONUC monitors the judicial process and individual cases with political or human rights concerns. The Mission brought to the attention of the Auditeur general in Kinshasa in May reports of the serious misconduct of the Auditeur de garnison in Bunia, who was replaced as a result.

63. It is unclear whether the authorities issued valid indictments and arrest warrants based upon evidence that would ultimately sustain criminal convictions when they arrested or detained seven prominent militia leaders earlier this year. MONUC is exploring ways to support and strengthen the investigative capacity of the Auditeur militaire through technical and logistical assistance and capacity-building and to assist the Congolese authorities in building legal cases to meet the necessary burden of proof.

Public information

64. Community outreach and liaison are important parts of MONUC public information activities. During the reporting period, the Mission sponsored a number of special events in Kinshasa and the provinces aimed at reducing violence and tensions through music, sport, theatre, conferences, debates and participation in national radio and television programmes.

65. Radio Okapi focused on reducing public tensions in anticipation of 30 June, primarily by explaining the transitional process and the process for holding credible

elections. It broadcasts daily several news reports, sensitization and civic education programmes, debates, skits and round-table discussions, through its network of national and 10 regional FM stations, 11 FM transmitters, five community radio partners, and by short-wave transmissions. Preparations continue for the opening of two additional regional stations at Mbuji-Mayi and Lubumbashi, while 20 additional FM transmitters are also to be set up.

Integrated mission concept

66. My Deputy Special Representative, who is also Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator, Deputy Designated Official and UNDP Resident Representative, chairs regular meetings of the Humanitarian Action Group, which includes the United Nations country team, donors and non-governmental organizations. The group facilitates enhanced coordination regarding humanitarian response, security, capacity-building and reconstruction programmes. It also ensures that the United Nations system speaks and acts with a shared sense of purpose.

67. A framework for the protection of civilians is being developed through which MONUC military police and civilian staff are preparing common approaches for the protection of civilians against violence, especially sexual violence; the reintegration of internally displaced persons, refugees and ex-combatants into their communities of origin; and the security of all United Nations staff and humanitarian workers. Provincial humanitarian action plans and coordination structures, including for the selection of quick-impact projects, also benefit from collaboration between MONUC and the United Nations agencies. Voluntary contributions for electoral activities, including security arrangements by the police, disarmament demobilization and reintegration and retraining of the national army are channelled through UNDP to support the provision of expertise by MONUC. Such synergies facilitate the optimal use of the United Nations common resources for the Congolese people.

Coordination between MONUC and ONUB

68. MONUC and ONUB representatives continue to communicate and meet regularly on issues of mutual concern. The second regular meeting of my Special Representatives for the two countries and their senior staff was held at Bujumbura on 9 and 10 May. There has been close coordination in recent months on the elections and the forced return of Rwandan refugees from Burundi in June. Humanitarian offices in the two missions have established a joint early warning mechanism to ensure timely responses to cross-border population movements.

IV. Conduct of MONUC personnel

69. The MONUC Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was established on 1 March, with the primary responsibility of addressing all matters relating to sexual exploitation and abuse in MONUC. The Office comprises five international civilian staff, eight investigators and one civilian police officer with specialized expertise in sexual exploitation and abuse.

70. MONUC activities relating to sexual exploitation and abuse encompass three key areas, namely, (a) conducting investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving all categories of MONUC personnel; (b) developing and implementing policies, with particular emphasis on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and assistance to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse in the broader context of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (c) providing training to all MONUC personnel on sexual exploitation and abuse, and raising awareness of the issue among the Congolese and the general public. In carrying out its activities, the Office works closely with other MONUC sections and components, as well as other United Nations agencies, national and international non-governmental organizations.

71. Early in 2005, my Special Representative and the Force Commander issued directives outlining preventive measures to address sexual exploitation and abuse, including a curfew and the designation of off-limits areas and premises. A number of actions have been taken to ensure the implementation of those measures, including patrols by MONUC military police and security personnel. With respect to military contingents, improved perimeter fencing and lighting around military compounds have been put up, and access control to military compounds has been strengthened. Military contingent personnel are also required to wear their uniforms at all times to facilitate monitoring of their movements when off duty. Welfare and recreational activities for civilian and military personnel are being gradually improved and contingents have reallocated available resources to create or upgrade recreational and sporting facilities. While reports indicate that these measures are generally being respected, some violations have been noted and appropriate and immediate action has been taken.

72. To ensure that investigations are in accordance with internationally accepted standards, the Office has developed standard operating procedures and guidelines for the conduct of investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. From 25 December 2004 to 30 June, 77 investigations were completed, of which 31 were closed because allegations could not be substantiated, for the following reasons: in six rape cases, the alleged perpetrators could not be identified by the victims, as they were severely traumatized and unable to recall the alleged perpetrator's appearance; in older cases, the rotation of the relevant military contingent out of the mission prevented the identification of the alleged perpetrators. Victims themselves were also sometimes difficult to locate and did not always wish to come forward with a complaint, because of fear, ignorance or cultural barriers. Of the completed (substantiated and unsubstantiated) investigations, approximately 40 per cent involved civilian personnel while 60 per cent involved military personnel. The types of allegations included rape (9 per cent), sex with minors (29 per cent), sex for employment (7 per cent) and sex with prostitutes (38 per cent). Twenty per cent of the investigations also involved paternity claims.

73. Thus far, 17 military personnel have been repatriated on disciplinary grounds, for offences including sex with prostitutes, engaging in a sexually exploitive relationship, assault, and failure to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. Of these, four were officers, including two commanding officers; six were warrant officers; and seven were from other ranks. With respect to civilian personnel, disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against eight individuals for offences ranging from sex with minors, sex for employment, sex with prostitutes and failure to cooperate

in an investigation. Four of these individuals held management-level positions in MONUC.

74. As at 30 June, 73 cases are outstanding, of which 53 are currently under investigation. Allegations continue to be received from a variety of sources, concerning both recent and older incidents. The reporting of older incidents, in particular, is attributed to the regular presence of specialized investigators in the field, the widely publicized preventive measures and the increased confidence of victims and witnesses in the commitment and capacity of MONUC to address sexual exploitation and abuse.

75. In March, an inter-agency sexual exploitation and abuse focal points network, chaired by MONUC, was established in Kinshasa. A first priority of the network is to strengthen linkages with agencies, coordinate victim assistance and referral initiatives on sexual violence, and develop a common code of conduct and guidelines for investigations and training. MONUC provides input to the Executive Committee on Peace and Security/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Task Force on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse at Headquarters and actively participates in its sub-groups, in particular the Working Group on Training and Assistance to Victims, which covers, inter alia, paternity-related issues. The Mission is also developing a referral network system of international and local non-governmental organizations through which victims can obtain medical, psycho-social and reintegration assistance. Quick-impact project funding will be used in support of these activities.

76. Finally, the Mission conducts regular training on sexual exploitation and abuse for all new civilian personnel, military observers, staff officers and civilian police. At the end of June 2005, some 400 persons of all categories of personnel attended training on sexual exploitation and abuse.

77. The measures taken thus far represent the foundation for an ongoing programme of vigilance and enforcement. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/287, MONUC will transfer all remaining investigations and allegations relating to category I offences, such as sexual exploitation and abuse, to the Office of Internal Oversight Services by early September 2005. Over the coming months, MONUC will continue to be challenged by the need to maintain momentum on efforts to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse through training, advocacy and public information campaigns. It will also focus on further developing strategies on assistance to victims and strengthening its network with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

V. Administrative aspects

78. Despite it own resource limitations, the MONUC administration has been fulfilling a number of support requests that fall outside its immediate area of responsibility. Air support was provided to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), involving the dedicated tasking of several aircraft. MONUC has also provided close to 2.5 million litres of aviation fuel to UNMIS aircraft in Entebbe since February 2005. MONUC also made available air assets in support of political negotiations in Burundi and to reinforce support for the elections in that country. One helicopter was placed at the disposal of ONUB early in July for electoral purposes and 35 support flights were also performed from April to June. Continued

logistic support, on a reimbursable basis, has also been provided to the International Criminal Court for its activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is expected that such requests for support will decrease as the capacity of the other operations increases. However, MONUC support capacity will be particularly tested when the Mission's scope of operations increases not only in support of the electoral process but also in support of robust operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

79. MONUC also continues to face challenges in recruiting qualified staff. There is a particular disproportion between the increased troop strength authorized under successive mandates of the Security Council and the requisite increase in mission support personnel. This situation has been exacerbated by the very high rate of attrition in MONUC, due to the particularly difficult conditions of service in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since January 2004, an average of two staff members have left the Mission for every three recruited, largely because of difficult conditions and the extended service of many mission staff.

VI. Financial aspects

80. The General Assembly, by its resolution 59/285 B of 22 June 2005, authorized me to enter into commitments in an amount not exceeding $383,187,800 for the maintenance of MONUC for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2005. My proposed budget for MONUC for the full 12-month period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 is currently in preparation and will be submitted to the General Assembly for review and action during the main part of its sixtieth session.

81. As at 30 June 2005, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $279 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,729.2 million.

82. Since its establishment in October 1999, the trust fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has received voluntary contributions amounting to $1.4 million, with expenditure to date of $1 million. As I indicated in my special report on elections (S/2005/320, para. 63), upon the appointment of the Ituri District Administration by the Transitional Government, the trust fund to support the Ituri Pacification Commission established in July 2003 had accomplished its purpose. Following consultations with the donors, the remaining balance of contributions to the trust fund in the amount of some $67,700 will be used to support the Ituri District Administration.

VII. Observations

83. I was pleased to note that, despite tensions, the deadline of 30 June marking the end of the first period of the transition passed without major disruption to the peace process. I commend the Transitional Government for creating the security conditions necessary to allow calm to prevail, as well as the political parties for their positive attitude towards the event. I also note with appreciation the facilitation efforts of my Special Representative, the members of the International Committee for Support to the Transition, the European Union and regional leaders.

84. In the run-up to the elections, the Congolese leaders must take additional steps to ensure respect for political inclusiveness and to ensure that all political parties sign and abide by the code of conduct. All concerned must refrain from inciting the public to disrupt the transition and the electoral process. The signatories of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement have a special responsibility in this regard. The Transitional Government must engage in an active public information campaign to ensure that the population understands the electoral process and is made aware of the electoral timetable. I also remind the Congolese leaders that they must abide by the electoral timetable, as any extension of the transition beyond the limits set by the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement would be unacceptable.

85. While the technical process for the holding of elections is on track, serious funding gaps remain. I commend the Independent Electoral Commission and its partners for meeting the challenges of organizing the elections and the European Union for its timely initiative in convening the donors conference in Brussels on 11 July, at which $100 million in additional electoral funding was pledged.

86. I urge the Security Council to approve the request detailed in my special report on elections (S/2005/320, para. 72) for MONUC to be able to provide logistical support, without which the electoral timetable will be seriously delayed. I also strongly appeal to the Security Council to give due consideration to the recommendations made in paragraphs 70 and 71 of that report for an increase in the authorized strength of the MONUC civilian police and military contingents. As the Congolese people prepare for the sensitive electoral phase of the peace process, it is essential that the international community send a clear signal of its determination to ensure that MONUC is provided with the resources required to create an environment conducive to the holding of peaceful and fair elections and to manage that process and its immediate aftermath in an effective manner. Thereafter, the Katanga brigade, which will be deployed for election security, and other relevant elements of the Mission will be closely evaluated with the view to recalibrating MONUC resources.

87. While attention is geared to the electoral process, the Transitional Government must at the same time strengthen its efforts to address the dire socio-economic conditions in the country. Decisive action needs to be taken to ensure the regular payment of civil servant salaries, extend the provision of health care and education, improve transport infrastructure, and ensure good governance. The Government must also build on recent progress in the reform and restructuring of the security services, particularly the armed forces and the national police. I would urge donors to continue to coordinate their support, and call upon the Congolese authorities to show the leadership and the political commitment necessary to ensure that this issue is effectively addressed. I also urge the Government to ensure that the security forces act in full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in carrying out their duties.

88. I remain deeply concerned about the continuing volatility in Ituri, which has major repercussions for the security of the Great Lakes region. The answer to the security problems in that area remains with the Transitional Government through the extension of State authority to address issues of illegal mining and cross-border commerce, arms flows and the armed groups. While the District Commissioner, the judiciary, the FARDC First Integrated Brigade and a small national police contingent continue to make significant contributions to pacification, Ituri, which is

home to 10 per cent of the country's population, still lacks customs and immigration officers at border crossing points, sufficient police officers and health and education officials. I urge the Transitional Government and its partners to urgently prepare a comprehensive plan, including the financial, material and human resources necessary to reintegrate Ituri into the nation as a whole and put an end to the illegal exploitation of resources. Without such decisive action, revenues will continue to be misappropriated by illegal actors, undermining the Transitional Government's credibility and endangering progress towards peace.

89. The international community must exert increased pressure on neighbouring countries to refrain from supporting militia groups and violating the arms embargo. Member States must also strongly encourage mining and trading companies to abide by good business practices in politically volatile and sensitive areas. I strongly urge Member States to take effective national and international action to prevent violations of the arms embargo and the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

90. I am encouraged by the interest and commitment shown by the Congolese authorities and Member States in my recommendation to set up an arrangement between donors, international financial institutions and the Transitional Government to promote good governance and accountable and transparent economic management. While the modalities for such a mechanism still need to be worked out, I would urge the Transitional Government and its international partners to address this matter urgently and in a far-reaching manner. I trust that the Government will provide its full cooperation in developing the mechanism, which is a vital element in consolidating peace.

91. It is most regrettable that the long-awaited declaration by FDLR in Rome on 31 March has not resulted in concrete progress towards disarmament and the repatriation of combatants. I therefore welcome the commitment made on 16 July by the Transitional Government to take forcible action to disarm FDLR. The Transitional Government, assisted by donors, must ensure that the armed forces are paid and receive adequate logistical support, which is necessary for the success of such an operation. MONUC will continue to take a more robust posture against various armed groups, while providing support within its means to FARDC. Meanwhile, I appeal to Member States to maintain pressure on all relevant parties to ensure that the repatriation process gets under way without further delay.

92. I am deeply saddened that, during the reporting period, two peacekeepers were killed in hostile action in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, bringing to 12 the number of MONUC troops killed this year. National staff, in particular Radio Okapi journalists, continue to be harassed and in some cases threatened while carrying out their work. Such threats to MONUC staff are unacceptable, and I call upon the Transitional Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that all MONUC staff can freely conduct their duties throughout the country without fear for their safety and security.

93. In conclusion, I would also like to thank my Special Representative and the personnel of MONUC, the United Nations system and international partners for their untiring efforts, often under conditions of personal risk, in the pursuance of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

United Nations S/2005/507

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 August 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 6 July 2005 from the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission has concluded its fifty-sixth session, which was held in Geneva from 28 to 30 June 2005.

During the opening plenary meeting, representatives of Kuwait and Iraq addressed the Council. Their respective statements are being sent by mail with the original of the present letter.

During the session, the Council considered four reports and recommendations made by the panels of Commissioners concerning the late filed category A and C claims programme; the special instalment of bedoun claims; Palestinian category D individual claims; and the fifth instalment of F4 claims. The first two reports, by the D1 panel of Commissioners, are concerned with (a) the review of the remaining Pakistani late claims accepted for filing by the Governing Council at its fifty-first session, and (b) the claims of the bedoun, as well as nine additional deceased detainee claims and one claim filed pursuant to Governing Council decision 12. The Palestinian report is concerned with individual Palestinian category D claims for damages above 100,000 United States dollars ($); and the F4 report is concerned with the review of the fifth and final instalment of environmental claims. The attached tables (see annex I) provide details of the amounts of compensation claimed in the reports and the amounts awarded by the Governing Council. The total amount awarded in all of the reports approved in the fifty-sixth session was $366,772,383.83.

In addition to the above-mentioned reports the Council discussed the following issues and decided as follows:

(a) To take note of the report of the Executive Secretary: summary of activities, covering the period from 1 February to 30 April 2005, and the information note prepared by the secretariat containing an update on the report;

(b) To request the secretariat to write to the Controller of the United Nations conveying the Governing Council's concerns regarding the current shortfall in the Compensation Fund, to request that the Controller, as the custodian of the Compensation Fund, explore on a priority basis and in consultation with the Executive Secretary, the appropriate action that may be taken to recover the amounts

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owed to the Fund, and keep the Commission apprised of the status of funds being transferred to the Compensation Fund;

(c) To approve corrections to certain category A, D, E and F claims and to category C Palestinian late claims contained in the thirtieth report of the Executive Secretary pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure;

(d) To request the secretariat to provide further information for the Working Group's consideration concerning a request made by the Government of Kuwait with respect to one deceased detainee claim by way of a letter dated 1 June 2005, prior to the September 2005 session;

(e) To request the secretariat to provide, for the Working Group's consideration prior to the September 2005 session, further information and proposals on appropriate action that may be taken with regard to the issue of duplication of awards on competing claims;

(f) That the Government of Iraq should be informed that the Council considers that its request concerning the compensability of interim environmental damages and the valuation of public health impacts, made by way of a note verbale and accompanying letter dated 16 August 2004 and at presentations by Iraq at the opening meetings of the fifty-third and fifty-fourth sessions, has been resolved in the report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the fifth instalment of F4 claims;

(g) That, following the meeting of F4 claimant Governments and the Government of Iraq to be held in Kuwait in September 2005, the secretariat be requested to provide an update concerning the potential for some public availability of the environmental monitoring and assessment databank maintained by the United Nations Environment Programme, which comprises information submitted by claimant Governments;

(h) That, following the meeting of F4 claimant Governments and the Government of Iraq to be held in Kuwait in September 2005, the secretariat also be requested to provide an update concerning the issue of the monitoring of the use of compensation awards;

(i) That further to the recommendations made by the F4 panel of Commissioners in its eighth report concerning the tracking of the progress of environmental monitoring and assessment projects compensated pursuant to Governing Council decision 132, to adopt the panel's recommendations set out in paragraphs 6, 8 and 12 to 14 of the report regarding, respectively, audit certificates concerning unfinished monitoring and assessment projects, the return of unused funds remaining after the completion of monitoring and assessment projects, and the continuation of certain ongoing studies into public health and natural resources damage; that, with respect to the panel's recommendation set out in paragraph 15 of the report concerning certain monitoring and assessment projects being conducted by the Government of Kuwait, that the secretariat inform Kuwait of the panel's recommendation and that the issue is under consideration by the Governing Council; and that the secretariat request an update on the status of the projects from Kuwait and provide further information concerning the issue for the Working Group's continued consideration;

(j) That, further to the recommendations made by the secretariat in information notes, dated 27 June 2005 and 3 May 2005, and in recommendation 3 of

the Office of Internal Oversight Services F4 audit report, dated 18 June 2005, to adopt the secretariat's recommendations concerning the return of unused funds remaining after the completion of its monitoring and assessment projects, and that ongoing monitoring and assessment projects be included in the substantive claims tracking mechanism;

(k) That the secretariat be requested to provide further updates on technical assistance provided to Iraq with respect to the F4 environmental claims after the receipt of any new invoices or after confirmation from the Government of Iraq that no further invoices are pending;

(l) To take note of the report of the Executive Secretary on the distribution of payments and transparency, and the return of undistributed funds, and to request the secretariat to continue to keep it informed of the reports of Governments and international organizations on the distribution of payments and the return of undistributed funds;

(m) That the secretariat should send a letter, as agreed upon by the Governing Council, to the Government of Bangladesh reiterating the Council's position that Governments should not deduct more than the 1.5 per cent fee for the payment of individual claims as stated in Governing Council decision 18, and that deductions in excess of 1.5 per cent from payments to the claimants should be corrected as a matter of urgency and reported to the Commission as soon as possible;

(n) That, unless the secretariat finds any outstanding issues in its review of additional information received from the Government of Egypt concerning its payment distribution reports, that issue has been resolved;

(o) That, with respect to the non-compliance by the Governments of Liberia, Senegal and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the requirements of decisions 18 and 48, the secretariat should continue its consultations with the Governments and write to Liberia reiterating the Council's concern regarding this issue;

(p) That the date of 30 September 2006 be set as the definitive date for the location of and payment to unlocated claimants and that the secretariat write to affected claimant Governments informing them of the decision;

(q) That, with respect to the possible duplicate awards, the secretariat revise draft letters to affected Governments for the Council's further consideration, and provide status updates on the issue for the informal oversight committee's continued consideration;

(r) To refer the Office of Internal Oversight Services proposal to the Executive Secretary dated 10 June 2005, concerning the secretariat's request for a forensic accountant and the response of the Deputy Executive Secretary thereto, dated 15 June 2005, to the informal oversight committee;

(s) To refer the issue of the payment of an award in respect of a directly submitted claim, pending the receipt of further documentation from the claimant's counsel, to an informal meeting of the Working Group;

(t) To take note of the information provided concerning fees for processing costs deducted from payments, and to request the secretariat to continue to provide an annual update on the matter;

(u) To adopt decision 250 (S/AC.26/Dec.250 (2005)), which states that the Council, taking into account all relevant circumstances, in particular the imminent completion of the Commission's claims processing programme and the unavailability of adequate funds, will not give any further consideration to claims preparation costs;

(v) To take note of the reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services concerning its audits of the fifth instalment of F4 claims, part two of the third instalment of F3 claims, the tenth instalment of E1 claims, part three of the nineteenth instalment of D1 claims, the Office of Internal Oversight Services advisory opinion on the review of selected D claims by the Commission and the secretariat's responses thereto;

(w) To take note also of the report of the Board of Auditors on the financial statements of the Commission for the biennium 2002-2003, the secretariat's response thereto, the draft report of the Board of Auditors on the implementation of the recommendations from the Board's review of the Commission's financial statements for the biennium 2002-2003, dated 15 June 2005, and the response of the Deputy Executive Secretary to that document, dated 16 June 2005;

(x) To refer the issue of post-2007 United Nations Compensation Commission activity to an informal meeting of the Working Group;

(y) To take note of the report of the Committee on Administrative Matters and its approval of the revisions to the 2004-2005 budget and the proposed budget of the Executive Secretary for the biennium 2006-2007 in the amount of $15,062,800;

(z) To request the secretariat to provide further information concerning an Iranian deceased detainee claim for the Working Group's consideration;

(aa) To request the secretariat to provide a briefing concerning the payment of one category E/F claim submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at an informal meeting of the Working Group;

(bb) To hold its fifty-seventh session from 27 to 29 September 2005.

I take the present opportunity to add that the approval of the reports of the panels of Commissioners marks the completion of 12 years of claims processing at the Commission and brings to an end the work of the panels of Commissioners, as a whole. Since the appointment of the first panels in 1993, over 2.68 million claims, seeking approximately $354 billion in compensation, have been resolved by the various panels of Commissioners. Awards of approximately $52.5 billion have been approved in respect of approximately 1.5 million of those claims, representing roughly 14.8 per cent of the amount claimed. The resolution of such a significant number of claims with such a large asserted value over a period as short as twelve years has no precedent in the history of international claims resolution.

To date, approximately $19.2 billion has been made available to Governments and international organizations for distribution to successful claimants in all categories of claims. In addition, pursuant to Governing Council decision 227, up to $200 million will be made available for distribution to successful claimants in July 2005.

(*Signed*) Tassos **Kriekoukis**
President of the Governing Council

Annex I

Summary of recommendations

A. Report and recommendations of the D1 panel of Commissioners concerning the late filed category A and category C claims programme (S/AC.26/2005/7)

Table 1
Recommended awards for category A claims

Country	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Pakistan	139	22	458 500	393 500

Table 2
Recommended awards for category C claims

Country	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Pakistan	151	27	20 955 613.25	4 164 964.99

B. Report and recommendations of the D1 panel of Commissioners concerning the special instalment of bedoun claims (S/AC.26/2005/8)

Table 3
Recommended awards for the bedoun claims

Country	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Kuwait	31 715	153	79 670 00	79 287 500

Table 4
Recommended awards for the deceased detainee claims

Country	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)[a]*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Kuwait (Iranian nationals)	1	—	310 458.48	506 931.96
Saudi Arabia	8	—	3 066 860.34	3 330 141.70
Total	**9**	—	**3 377 318.82**	**3 837 073.66**

Note: An em dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil.

[a] This amount relates in part to claims for mental pain and anguish, in respect of which the claimants were not required to specify a particular claimed amount.

Table 5
Recommended award for claim for death resulting from landmine explosion

Country	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)[a]*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Kuwait	1	—	640 138.41	620 114.43

[a] This amount relates in part to claims for mental pain and anguish, in respect of which the claimants were not required to specify a particular claimed amount.

C. Report and recommendations made by the D2 panel of Commissioners concerning the Palestinian individual claims for damages above $100,000 (category D claims) (S/AC.26/2005/9)

Table 6
Recommended awards for category D Palestinian claims

Submitting entity	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Palestine	296	106	836 915 789.40	25 872 466.70

Table 7
Recommended awards for category C Palestinian claims

Submitting entity	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Total amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)*	*Total amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Palestine	14	3	2 922 847.74	568 296.05

D. Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the fifth instalment of F4 claims (S/AC.26/2005/10)

Table 8
Recommended awards for the fifth instalment of F4 claims

Country	*Number of claims recommended for payment*	*Number of claims not recommended for payment*	*Amount of compensation claimed (United States dollars)*	*Amount of compensation recommended (United States dollars)*
Iran	4	1	11 090 762 249	27 780 752
Jordan	1	1	5 217 117 182	161 926 734
Kuwait	2	2	2 715 934 222	16 207 276
Saudi Arabia	1	3	28 742 311 029	46 113 706
Syrian Arab Republic	—	3	2 165 021 052	—
Turkey	—	1	5 417 263	—
Total	**8**	**11**	**49 936 562 997**	**252 028 468**

Note: An em dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil.

Annex II

Documents before the Governing Council at its fifty-sixth session

1. Second report and recommendations of the D1 panel of Commissioners concerning the late filed category A and category C claims programme (S/AC.26/2005/7);

2. Decision concerning the second instalment in the late-filed category A and category C claims programme (S/AC.26/Dec.245 (2005));

3. Report and recommendations of the D1 panel of Commissioners concerning the special instalment of bedoun claims (S/AC.26/2005/8);

4. Decision concerning the special instalment of bedoun claims (S/AC.26/Dec.246 (2005));

5. Report and recommendations made by the D2 panel of Commissioners concerning Palestinian individual claims for damages above $100,000 (category D claims) (S/AC.26/2005/9);

6. Decision concerning Palestinian individual claims for damages above $100,000 (category D claims) (S/AC.26/Dec.247 (2005));

7. Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the fifth instalment of F4 claims (S/AC.26/2005/10);

8. Decision concerning the fifth instalment of F4 claims (S/AC.26/Dec.248 (2005));

9. Thirtieth report of the Executive Secretary pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/2005/11);

10. Decision concerning corrections pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/Dec.249 (2005));

11. Decision concerning claims preparation costs (S/AC.26/Dec.250 (2005)).

United Nations S/2005/508

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 July 2005

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 29 July 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Vanessa Howe-Jones, Catherine Brooker, Adam Bye, Christophe McBride, Ian Collard, Paddy Davie, Rosemary Davis, Justin McKenzie Smith, Anne Power, Samantha Purdy, Simon Williams, Ying Yee and Gavin Watson have been appointed alternate representatives of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

05-45246 (E) 040805

United Nations S/2005/509

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 August 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 3 August 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which expires on 12 August 2005, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1557 (2004) of 12 August 2004.

Since the adoption of resolution 1557 (2004), UNAMI has, under the leadership of my Special Representative, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, made great efforts, as far as the circumstances have permitted, to assist the Iraqi people and Government pursuant to resolution 1546 (2004) of 8 June 2004. In accordance with paragraph 7 (a) of that resolution, UNAMI has endeavoured to play a leading role to help Iraq meet each benchmark of its political transition process, including by: (i) assisting, during the summer of 2004, in the convening of a national conference to select a Consultative Council; (ii) advising and supporting the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, with regard to the process of holding elections; and (iii) promoting national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq.

UNAMI has also, in accordance with paragraph 7 (b) of resolution 1546 (2004), endeavoured, from both inside and outside Iraq, to (i) advise the Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and social services; (ii) contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance; (iii) help promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law; and (iv) advise the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the eventual conduct of a comprehensive census.

Despite severe operational and security constraints, UNAMI has grown in size and expanded its activities beyond Baghdad since it resumed operations in Iraq in August 2004. At present, there are 260 UNAMI civilian and military personnel based in Iraq. These numbers are expected to rise further in 2005 with the operational use of new facilities in Erbil and Basrah, and increased reconstruction, development and humanitarian activities in those areas.

Through UNAMI, the United Nations stands ready to continue to assist the Government and the people of Iraq. UNAMI electoral and constitutional support will remain available beyond the scheduled completion of the proposed transitional timetable outlined in resolution 1546 (2004), if so requested by the Iraqi Government. Similarly, UNAMI is ready to continue to assist in the fields of

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reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance as long as may be deemed necessary by the Iraqi Government.

Needless to say, adequate support, resources and expertise will be required for UNAMI to continue to implement its mandated tasks. In this regard, I welcome the spirit of international cooperation, evidenced at the Brussels Conference on Iraq on 22 June 2005, and hope that it will translate into increased support for the efforts of the United Nations inside Iraq. Ultimately, the mandate of UNAMI can be fully implemented only in close cooperation with the Iraqis and with the continued active support of the Security Council and the international community.

In the light of the foregoing, I wish to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNAMI pursuant to resolution 1546 (2004) for a further period of 12 months, with the intention of reviewing the mandate at the end of that period, or sooner, if so requested by the Government of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

United Nations A/59/892–S/2005/510

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
4 August 2005

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 29
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Letter dated 2 August 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 17 May 2005, addressed to you, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 27 and 29 May 2005, on 1, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 29 June 2005, and on 1, 3, 6, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24 and 27 July 2005, as follows.

On 14 May 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 15 May 2005, one C-130, one C-160, two CN-235 and, four F-4 coming in one formation and six Turkish military aircraft of unknown type entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of nine violations of the international air traffic regulations and eight violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting in a south-easterly direction. On the same day, it entered again the FIR of Nicosia, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting in a south-easterly direction. On the same day, it entered again the FIR of Nicosia, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

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(c) The two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue mission, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(d) A formation of four F-4 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting in a south-easterly direction;

(e) A formation of four Turkish military aircraft of unknown type coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting in a south-easterly direction;

(f) A formation of two (2) Turkish military aircraft of unknown type coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting in a south-easterly direction.

On 16 May 2005, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 18 May 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Adana, from where it returned on the same day to the illegal airport of Krini.

On the same day, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 20 May 2005, two C-160, one CN-235 and three formations of a total of ten F-4 Turkish military aircraft (1X2 and 2X4) entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of eight violations of international air traffic regulations and an equivalent number of violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The two C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting in a south-easterly direction. On the same day, coming from the same south-easterly direction, they entered the FIR of Nicosia, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue mission, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(c) The three formations of the ten F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia from a south-easterly direction, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 22 May 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kyrenia, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 25 May 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 27 and 29 May 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type and one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of three violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The Turkish military aircraft of unknown type coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kyrenia, before landing at the illegal airport of Krini;

(b) The C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 1 June 2005, one C-130 and one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of three violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied areas of Morfou, Kormakitis, Karpasia and Mesaoria, before landing at the same airport.

On 8 June 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 13 June 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 15 June 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 17 June 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before landing at the illegal airport of Krini.

On 17, 18 and 20 June 2005, two C-160 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where they departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 23 June 2005, two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out three violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The second CN-235 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Tymbou, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, to which it later returned, before departing towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 24 June 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 26 June 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 27 June 2005, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou.

On 28 June 2005, one CN-235, one C-130, and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out five violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft took off twice from the illegal airport of Tymbou, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, carrying out a parachuter exercise, before landing at the same airport;

(b) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kythrea, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(c) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, flying over the occupied area of Kythrea, before returning to the same airport.

On 29 June 2005, one CN-235 and one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out four violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Tymbou, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, carrying out a parachuter exercise over the occupied area of Lefkoniko, before landing at the same airport, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 1 and 3 July 2005, two Turkish military aircraft of unknown type carried out two violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first Turkish military aircraft of unknown type coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before landing at the illegal airport of Krini;

(b) The second Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 6 July 2005, one CN-235 and one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out four violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 13 July 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 17 July 2005, two C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where they departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 18 July 2005, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 19 July 2005, two formations (2X5) of ten NF-5 Turkish military aircraft, one C-130, one CN-235 and one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of six violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The NF-5 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, where they remained;

(b) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, where it remained;

(c) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(d) The Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Karpasia, before returning to the same airport.

On the same day, one formation of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft (number unknown) took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kyrenia, before returning to the same airport.

On 20 July 2005, two formations (1X5, 1X8) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft, one C-130 and two Turkish military aircraft of unknown type entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of five violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first formation (1X5) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Krini;

(b) The second formation (1X8) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kyrenia, before landing at the same airport;

(c) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(d) The two Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before landing at the same airport.

On 21 July 2005, two formations (2X5) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft, two C-130 and one B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out a total of six violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The two formations (2X5) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The first C-130 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(c) The second C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko;

(d) The B-200 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko.

On 22 and 24 July 2005, two C-130 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out five violations of international air traffic

regulations and three violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first C-130 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The second C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where it departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(c) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations, flying in a sou'h-westerly direction.

On 27 July 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the international air traffic regulations and national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

It is also noted that apart from the aforementioned violations, on 15 and 20 May 2005, the Turkish navy and air force conducted an illegal military exercise within the Nicosia FIR and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus. The exercise was conducted without proper coordination with the Cyprus authorities, under whose jurisdiction the Nicosia FIR operates, and in complete disregard of international standards and safety regulations of air navigation.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the aforementioned provocations by Turkey and call for their immediate cessation. While expecting Turkey to fulfil its Cyprus-related obligations that arise from its agreements with the European Union, as well as from international law, Turkey remains engaged in its well-known divisive policy towards Cyprus, which aims at the consolidation of the status quo and the promotion of its subordinate local administration. We regret that, in the course of carrying out that policy, Turkey does not hesitate to disregard international law, Security Council resolutions and international safety standards and regulations. What is even more regrettable, however, is the insistence of Turkey to place at risk the peace and stability of a particularly sensitive region and further complicate the settlement of the Cyprus issue.

We therefore call upon Turkey to review its policy towards Cyprus, put an end to its threatening behaviour and its might-is-right-based approach and refrain from undermining the prospects for reunification and reconciliation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 29, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**

United Nations S/2005/511

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 4 August 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) established by the Security Council in its resolution 690 (1991) of 29 April 1991.

Following the usual consultations, it is my intention to appoint Mr. Francesco Bastagli (Italy) as my Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, as of 1 September 2005. Mr. Bastagli is currently serving as my Deputy Special Representative for civil administration for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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United Nations S/2005/512

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 8 August 2005 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 4 August 2005 (S/2005/511) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Francesco Bastagli (Italy) as your Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Kenzo **Oshima**
President of the Security Council

05-45471 (E) 090805

United Nations S/2005/513

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2005

Original: English

Twentieth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), in which the Council requested me to report every four months on the compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains. The report provides an account of the relevant developments since my last report (S/2005/377).

II. Background

2. During the reporting period, several international forums addressed issues related to the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains. The fifteenth session of the Joint Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union, held in Manama, Bahrain, on 5 April 2005 (A/59/824-S/2005/363), expressed its strong condemnation of the killing of thousands of Iraqi citizens, Kuwaiti prisoners and citizens of other countries as revealed by the discovery of mass graves all over Iraq. It stressed the importance of holding officials of the deposed Iraqi regime accountable and bringing them to justice for such heinous crimes.

3. The ninety-fifth regular session of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council, held in Riyadh on 11 June 2005 (A/59/845-S/2005/386), condemned the flagrant and gross violation of human rights, Islamic principles and Arab morals and values represented in the deliberate mass killing of Iraqis and prisoners of war, including Kuwaiti nationals and nationals of other States, perpetrated by the former Iraqi regime and brought to light with the recent discovery of mass graves. It should be recalled that the ninety-fourth regular session of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council, held in Riyadh on 13 March 2005 (A/59/761-S/2005/215), among other things, expressed appreciation to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Tripartite Commission for seeking the Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and missing persons whose fate and whereabouts are still unknown. It called on all parties to continue working together in order to bring an end to the matters pending in connection with this humanitarian question.

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III. Recent activities

4. In a letter dated 25 May 2005, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations advised the High-level Coordinator, Yuli Vorontsov, that the total number of identified remains had reached 227. These files have been formally closed. The names of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals whose remains have been identified are listed in the annex to the present report, where it is noted that some remains were those of citizens of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

5. 17 to 18 July 2005, Ambassador Vorontsov travelled to Kuwait where he had meetings with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, members of the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs and other officials. On behalf of the Kuwaiti people, the Kuwaiti officials expressed appreciation to Ambassador Vorontsov for his continued coordination activities. The Coordinator assured his interlocutors that he would continue his efforts to bring to a satisfactory closure the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals.

6. The high-level Coordinator was informed that out of 227 identified remains, 86 had been retrieved from grave sites in Samawa, 80 from Karbala, 34 from Amarah, 25 from Ramadi and 2 from Kuwait. These identifications were based on the mortal remains brought to Kuwait in 2004. The exhumation process has been complicated by several factors, the most significant of which is the difficult security situation in Iraq. Among other factors are the weather and ground conditions, the arrangement of mortal remains found in the graves and the presence of extraneous bacteria in human remains.

7. Information about the location of grave sites possibly containing the remains of Kuwaiti and third country nationals continued to come from different sources. The Kuwaiti assessment teams visited Iraq during the period from March through May 2005. These field missions were coordinated with the Iraqi side and the multinational force, which provided security.

8. The Kuwaiti officials stressed the constructive cooperation on the part of the new Iraqi authorities. Iraqi representatives took part in the joint assessment and investigation efforts. Furthermore, Iraq informed Kuwait of a mass grave site that presumably contained the remains of several dozen Kuwaitis, according to bones and clothes appearing on the surface. Investigation of this site will continue.

9. The field work in Iraq was made possible as a result of the security and logistical support provided to the Kuwaiti search and assessment teams by members of the multinational force in Iraq, which includes contingents from the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Denmark and Thailand. Their cooperation and positive attitude with regard to this humanitarian issue have been indispensable.

10. Ambassador Vorontsov was briefed on the forty-eighth session of the Technical Subcommittee of the Tripartite Commission, which was held in Kuwait on 19 June 2005. The session was attended by representatives of France, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United States and ICRC. It once again demonstrated the productive cooperation between the members of the Technical Subcommittee.

11. In another development, the mortal remains and identification card of an Iraqi soldier have been found in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti authorities have initiated the

administrative procedures with a view to repatriating the remains and belongings to Iraq.

12. Efforts to resolve the case of the missing American serviceman, Captain Michael Scott Speicher, have continued. Kuwait has agreed to enter the DNA information from his family in the Kuwaiti database used to identify mortal remains.

IV. Observations

13. I welcome the continuation of the essentially humanitarian process set forth by paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). The activities of the Kuwaiti assessment and investigation teams in Iraq inspire hope that eventually more human remains will be brought to Kuwait and more substantive progress will be achieved in the near future in closing the files. I am pleased to note the constructive stance taken by the new Iraqi authorities in this regard and the practical assistance provided to Kuwait by the multinational force in Iraq, especially in the area of security.

14. Given the extent of cooperation among the members of the Tripartite Commission and its Technical Subcommittee, as well as the determination of all parties concerned to move forward, I am confident that the issue of the Kuwaiti prisoners of war and third-country nationals will be brought to a satisfactory closure. The High-level Coordinator will continue to work in close contact with the Commission and the Governments of Kuwait and Iraq.

15. As in the past, I strongly condemn the senseless execution of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals by the previous Iraqi regime. This killing and the decade-long cover-up of the truth constitute a grave violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. Those responsible for these horrendous crimes, in particular those who ordered the executions, must be brought to justice.

Annex

Names of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals whose remains have been identified

1. Saad Meshal Aswad Salamah Al-Enezi
2. Ahmed Abdullah Abdulrasul Al-Ghallaf
3. Saleh Ali Said Al-Hayani
4. Enam Said Ahmad Said Ismail Al-Edan
5. Abdullatif Hussein Al-Waheb
6. Naser Hussein Omaran Al-Enezi
7. Mahmoud Sayed Reda Sayed Hasan
8. Faihan Mohammad Laili Al-Mutairi
9. Nasser Sherif Fahed Al-Khaldi
10. Daad Omar Al-Hariri (Lebanese)
11. Jassem Hamid Abdallah Al-Samak
12. Safah Ibjad Aloush Al-Mutairi
13. Lafi Faihan Mohammad Laili Al-Mutairi
14. Abdul Rahman Saad Marzook Al-Otaibi
15. Mohammed Gazai Saad Ali Al-Mutairi
16. Farhan Harbi Saket Al-Dhafiri
17. Obaid Falah Husaini Al-Mutairi
18. Hamad Mohammad Ghuneim Al-Ajami
19. Taleb Amin Jassem Saleh
20. Fahed Sulayman Aswad Al-Enezi
21. Fahed Akil Rakan Al-Zufayri (Saudi)
22. Misfir Mhana Misfir Al-Sharifa Al-Hayani
23. Nasser Ayed Duhayran Al-Oteibi
24. Mohammad Nasser Sharid Al-Ajami
25. Assal Turki Kusayman Al-Ajami
26. Abdallah Sulayman Abdallah Al-Amir
27. Abdulaziz Yussef Abdulaziz Alyamani
28. Amer Deydan Ali Al-Ajami
29. Sobhi Khalil Nousouhi Haydar (Lebanese)
30. Raja Hamud Saleh Al-Sahli

31. Khaled Saleh Al-Tuwaygeri
32. Adel Fahed Hamad Al-Hamad
33. Fahed Khalifa Jadlan Al-Mutayri
34. Salem Obeid Abdallah Al-Mutayri
35. Shojah Madi Omar Al-Ajami
36. Habib Saleh Al-Zaqah
37. Ali Abdallah Ali Al-Duwaysan
38. Maayuf Jaber Sahud Al-Harbi
39. Yaccoub Yussef Bader Al-Ustaz
40. Mansour Tulayhan Samar Al-Mutayri
41. Hamad Humaydi Ghazi Al-Otaibi
42. Mohsen Mohammad Mohsen Al-Ajami
43. Rajeh Zeyab Bedah Nahar Al-Mutayri
44. Mansour Faleh Nasser Al-Thaqeb
45. Ahmad Mahmoud Al-Hattab (Egyptian)
46. Jaber Helal Shedid Al-Shemary
47. Falah Jaser Saad Guniman Al-Mutayri
48. Jatly Mohammad Mejaed Al-Mutayri
49. Husain Salem Faza Al-Shamry
50. Khalifa Trak Suliman Al-Shamry
51. Adel Faleh Satam Al-Fadly
52. Adnan Mohamad Bahbahani
53. Tareq Falah Alaeban Al-Shamry
54. Hamoud Nafel Saeid Al-Harshany
55. Nabil Ali Ramadan Bushehry
56. Mutlaq Ali Salman Al-Adwani
57. Waleed Saad Mubarak Al-Asaf
58. Abdulah Fares Ayed Al-Shamry
59. Bader Nahar Mefrij Al-Mutayri
60. Matar Saket Mater Al-Mayai Al-Anezi
61. Waleed Ayoub Ismail Bander
62. Helal Saleh Malis Al-Mutayri
63. Abdulaziz Abdullalif Abdulaziz Al-Kharaz
64. Mubarak Saleh Herzan Malis Al-Mutayri

65. Hamoud Ebrahim Harfan Al-Sahly
66. Saad Murshid Jasir Al-Barazi
67. Raeid Abdulla Khalil Burashid
68. Saleh Hamoud Mansour Hamoud
69. Abdulmehdi Mehdi Ali Tahir
70. Hussam Mohammad Abdulmohsen Al-Oseimi
71. Abdalla Al-Oweyhan
72. Hussein Mohammad Jomah
73. Hassan Abdulmohsen Al-Ali
74. Mohammad Makboul Al-Otaibi
75. Ali Hassan Awad Al-Azmi
76. Hamoud Nassir Baanoun El-Enezi
77. Khalaf Akil Ali Al-Dhafiri
78. Saad Bashir Mubarak Al-Rashidi
79. Mohammad Rashid Nabi Al-Duwaila
80. Nawaf Abdulla Farraj Al-Mutairi
81. Saleh Mathal Jasser Al-Mutairi
82. Mohammad Ahmad Shaher Al-Sharifi
83. Abdulla Deydan Kazar Al-Dhafiri
84. Maged Jaber Fyhan El-Enezi
85. Tarek Mohammad El-Qahtany
86. Meshal Jazza El-Enezi
87. Fawzy Ali Ebrahim Al-Mulla
88. Saleh Naser Al-Khenah
89. Esam Yaccoub Saadallah
90. Meshal Yussef Ali Reda
91. Hany Ahmed Al-Musilikh
92. Ahmed Ali Al-Kandary (Iranian)
93. Abdulaziz Ali Mohammad Al-Khanini
94. Fauzi Ebrahim Abdullatif Al-Abed Al-Jalil
95. Mohammad Naeif Muthri Al-Shamry
96. Jamal Mubarak Muwanas Al-Muwanas
97. Salah Jassem Mandani Qassem Ghullam
98. Abdullah Shafi Hafiz Al-Shagban Al-Ajami

99. Qadir Abdulrahman Jassem Mustafa
100. Ismail Ebrahim Mohammad A. Al-Kandary
101. Yacoub Hussein Ali Akbar
102. Mohammad Ali Saleh Al-Zaqah
103. Ahmad Abdulla Mustafa Hadi
104. Waleed Feiruz Yaqout Al-Manea
105. Mohammad Ahmad Mohammad Al-Rashed
106. Saoud Abdulaziz Furaih Al-Kouh
107. Khaled Abdulaziz Furaih Al-Kouh
108. Ali Mohammad Ali Salem
109. Adnan Feiruz Yacout Al-Manea
110. Fahed Ali Kamikh Al-Dehani
111. Hani Feiruz Yacout Al-Manea
112. Mohammad Mutlaq Rumeih Al-Bathali
113. Hamad Muajeb Saad Al-Ajmi
114. Mutlaq Abdallah Mutlaq Al-Hajr Al-Mutairi
115. Zakaria Abdulqader Mohammad Al-Qaderi
116. Ahmad Saleh Aboud Al-Enezi
117. Ajmi Awajah Rashid Al-Rashidi
118. Shaker Abdallah Mohammad Al-Jedi
119. Nabil Mohammad Hassan Al-Sharaf
120. Hamoud Marzook Thamer Al-Fadly
121. Khaled Hussein Aoun Al-Atiyah
122. Maysam Rawdan Adnan Jodah Al-Shamry
123. Mohammad Hamoud Ayed Al-Aqail
124. Mohammad Jassem Khalf Al-Thanian
125. Mohammad Mrzook Mohammad Al-Mrzook
126. Mutlaq Abdul Rahman Mutlaq Al-Khalidi
127. Housain Mohammad Hosain Adab
128. Talal Hadi Al-Otaibi
129. Khaled Nasser Fahd Al-Ajami
130. Abdul Razzaq Abdullah Mubarak Al-Fawzan
131. Ali Husain Naserallah Boshahryary (Iranian)
132. Saoud Manea Mohammad Tahous

133. Khaled Ahmed Mohammad Al-Rashed
134. Hamoud Muhareb Ali Al-Shamry
135. Abdullah Fahm Moatesh Al-Mutairi
136. Srour Falah Srour Al-Rashaidi
137. Abdallah Wali Hizam Al-Shamry (non-Kuwaiti)
138. Nasser Fahed Mohammad Al-Ajami
139. Fahed Wali Hizam Al-Shamry (non-Kuwaiti)
140. Mohammad Faleh Abboud Al-Enezi
141. Faisal Ghali Ashwi Al-Dhafiri
142. Nasser Ali Nasser Al-Ajami
143. Nawaf Hamad Hussein Al-Ajami
144. Khaled Nasser Khaled Al-Subaii
145. Alnouri Khalaf Kuwayan Al-Dhafiri (Saudi)
146. Mansour Awad Mansour Al-Ajami
147. Fahed Alhailam Musmar Al-Dhafiri
148. Jamal Abbas Ghaloum Hussein
149. Abdulkarim Ali Khaled Mohammad
150. Mousa Ebrahim Suleiman Al-Khalifi
151. Abdulaziz Ebrahim S. Al-Badyawi (Saudi)
152. Abdulrazaq Dakhil Abdulrazaq Al-Tawalah
153. Hamad Mubarak Salem Al-Hajri
154. Khaled Ahmad Mubarak Al-Sharhan
155. Mohammad Serhan Aswad El-Enezi
156. Fahed Bashir Mubarak Al-Rashidi
157. Ahmad Abdulla Ahmad Al-Kandari
158. Dhafir Abdulhadi Dhafir Al-Rashidi
159. Hamdan Hamoud Ghazi Al-Otaibi
160. Mansour Faleh Nasser Al-Ajmi
161. Salah Ali Murshid Al-Rashidi
162. Meshal Obeid Hamdan Al-Otaibi
163. Hamoud Mohwis Saoud Al-Saidi
164. Mohammad Nasser Hazzah Al-Otaibi
165. Abdullah Salem Salem Gheith
166. Fahed Mohammad Abdulla Al-Khalidi

167. Faisal Zaid Sulaiman Al-Ajeel
168. Husam Ahmad Mohammad Al-Sayafi
169. Salah Abdulla Abdulrahman Al-Majid
170. Mohammad Ali Abdulla Burhameh
171. Nasser Mudaf Ahmad Khalfan
172. Safi Maatouk Aman Al-Felaij
173. Khaled Nouri Sulaiman Al-Qanai
174. Imad Yussef Saad Al-Rashid
175. Ahmad Hussein Bakr Al-Asfour
176. Ahmad Abdulrahman Abdulmohsen Al-Rifai
177. Khaled Ahmad Issa Matar
178. Ali Abdullatif Abdallah Al-Asfour
179. Imad Abdulwahab Hussein Al-Roumi
180. Sami Khalifa Ebrahim Al-Rashed
181. Esam Abdulwahab Hussein Al-Roumi
182. Salah Khalifa Abdalla Al-Derbas
183. Faisal Ahmad Hussein Al-Qattan
184. Jamal Abdul Hamid Essa Al-Attar
185. Mustafa Abdul Hamid Matar Al-Shatti
186. Shaheen Ahmad Majid Al-Shaheen
187. Fahed Ahmad Majid Al-Shaheen
188. Khaled Marzooq Zaid Al-Mutayri
189. Meshal Ahmad Thenian Al-Musailem
190. Ali Zaal Awad Al-Zufayri (Saudi)
191. Abdallah Rahed Ahmad Al-Yacoub
192. Mohammad Naeif Abdallah Al-Enezi
193. Bader Abdallah Ahmad Al-Sharqawi
194. Mahmoud Naeif Abdallah Al-Enezi
195. Khaled Abdullatif Abdallah Al-Mari
196. Mohammad Yousef Said Albaloushi (Omani)
197. Hussein Abdel Amir Ali Mohammad (Iranian)
198. Fahed Ahmad Abdulmohsen Al-Abdulkarim
199. Rashed Zayed Mutlaq Al-Duwailah
200. Adel Ahmad Abdulaziz Al-Raqim

201. Rashid Mazeid Said Al-Mutairi
202. Abdulla Abdullatif Abdulla Al-Asfour
203. Waleed Hamad Al-Fahed Al-Hamad
204. Mohammad Abed Ridha Abbas Ghaloum
205. Samir Jasem Mahmoud Al-Saffar
206. Aref Ebrahim Youssef Al-Dhowaihi (Saudi)
207. Najim Taleq Saoud Al-Muweizri
208. Nasser Hazaa Zaid Alwaalan Al-Mutairi
209. Nasser Sulaiman Farah Al-Shamry
210. Hassan AbdulAziz Qumir Abdullah
211. Khaled Jassem Hamd Al-Derbas Al-Zaabi
212. Shehab Ahmed Shaker Ali
213. Mousa AbdulRidha Abbas Ghaloum
214. Madi Hameed Obaid Al-Mutairi
215. Zaid Saadi Zaid Al-Shamry
216. Hassan Guloum Hassan Sakkin
217. Hussein Abdullah Ahmed Al-Ghallaf
218. Salah Ali Saad Al-Khouder
219. Salah Abdullatif Farhan Al-Doukhi
220. Sayed Mohammad Sayed Ali Musalam
221. Abdul Amir Hussein Ahmad Al-Qattan
222. Adnan Safar Maarafi Maarafi
223. Mohammad Sayed Ali Hamza
224. Muwanas Mubarak Muwanas Al-Muwanas
225. Adel Ebrahim Mohammad Al-Murayshed
226. Murshed Julaydan Mohammad Al-Hamad
227. Khaled Hazzah Hamad Al-Fahed al-Hamad

United Nations S/2005/514

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 August 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 1 August 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement concerning the elections in Guinea-Bissau issued on 1 August 2005 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Emyr **Jones Parry**
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
to the United Nations

05-45618 (E) 110805

Annex to the letter dated 1 August 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English, French and Spanish]

Statement concerning the elections in Guinea-Bissau issued on 1 August 2005 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union

The European Union is pleased to note that the second round of the Presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau was considered by international observers, in particular the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), to have been peaceful and generally well organized in a transparent and inclusive manner, in line with international principles for democratic elections. Voters were able to exercise their franchise freely, despite a tense pre-election period.

The European Union congratulates the people of Guinea-Bissau for turning out peacefully to demonstrate a clear commitment to peace and democracy, and notes that the armed forces have supported the conduct of a democratic election process. The European Union also congratulates the National Election Commission for its successful and professional work through the electoral process.

The European Union notes the provisional regional results, published on 28 July, and calls on all political parties and stakeholders to ensure that the remaining part of the election process will be completed in good order and in line with constitutional and other legal provisions.

The Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate Countries Turkey and Croatia,* the Countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

* Croatia continues to be part of the Stabilization and Association Process.

United Nations S/2005/515

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 August 2005

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq, in particular 1500 (2003) of 14 August 2003, 1546 (2004) of 8 June 2004, and 1557 (2004) of 12 August 2004,

Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Recalling the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003, and extended on 12 August 2004, and reaffirming that the United Nations should play a leading role in assisting the efforts of the Iraqi people and Government in developing institutions for representative government, and in promoting national dialogue and unity,

Stressing that this Iraqi national dialogue, which UNAMI should assist, is crucial for Iraq's political stability and unity,

Taking note of the letter dated 3 August 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/509),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for another period of twelve months from the date of this resolution;

2. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate of UNAMI in twelve months or sooner, if requested by the Government of Iraq;

3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

05-45775 (E) 110805